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The United States' Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the OECD AntiBribery Recommendation: When
Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the
Money Argument
Beverley Earle*
I.

Introduction

When the United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) in 1977, it was the lone voice for reform in the
international arena of business transactions.1 It was an attempt to
regulate transactions by United States companies and individuals
and their agents abroad. The legislation represented efforts to
enforce a concept of morality and to "level the playing field" in
forbidding the use of corrupt payments offered to foreign officials
to obtain or retain business. The anticipated rush by other
countries to follow the United States' lead never occurred.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Bentley College, Waltham, MA. B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Special thanks
to Margo Reder, J.D., Research Associate, Bentley College, for her assistance in
research and editing.
1. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78n, 78t, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (1976). See generally
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.) 1494-1500 (setting forth text of original FCPA); S.
Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-14 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4098-4127 (setting forth legislative history of FCPA noting persistence of problem
of improper payments to foreign government officials by American corporations).
2. See generally William L. Jennings & Craig A. Gillen, Complying With the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at C10; Morton Mintz,
Hill Considers Changing Law on Foreign Bribery, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1987, at
H6 (noting FCPA law stems from events beginning in 1974 when United Brands
paid a bribe in exchange for favorable tax treatment and such revelations caused
global turmoil); Juan J. Walte, Antibribery Law Eased, UPI, Nov. 23, 1981,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File (noting problematic implementation of FCPA and reporting Senate's acknowledgement that standards were not
realistic in practical world in which international commerce operates).
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Nonetheless, the U.S. standing alone defended its action based on
moral principles.
The criticism of the FCPA resulted in significant amendments
in 1988.' Embedded in these changes was a recognition that the

law needed to be reevaluated in light of the progress, or lack
thereof, by other countries. The legislation called for a report
within a year.4 Six years after the amendments, however, a
surprise occurred. In 1994, the OECD5 passed an Antibribery
Recommendation (ABR) and urged member nations to adopt
legislation that would mirror the principles enshrined in the
Recommendation. 6
One year later, there has been no great rush to enact such
legislation in these countries.7 However, there is a growing
recognition that an environment in which bribery is fostered,
condoned, tolerated or ignored is not conducive to economic
development.' Furthermore, the economic costs of bribery are
much higher than the moral cost. A fact which may persuade
countries that have balked at United States absolutism, to reevaluate their position.9
3. The FCPA was amended in 1988 by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA), Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-1425.
The OTCA specifically amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1994). For
a discussion of the coverage and impact of the OTCA, see Beverley H. Earle,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: The OTCA Focus on Improving
Investment Opportunities,37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549 (1989); Allan F. Holmer &
Judith H. Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the International
Trading System? 23 INT'L L. 523 (1989).
4. Act of Aug. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.)
1424-25 (requesting the President to develop agreement among OECD members
on prohibiting acts of bribery, and calling for a report back to Congress on such
progress, as well as any recommendations).
5. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See infra notes
143-44 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and purposes of the
OECD).
6. OECD Governments Agree to Combat Bribery, OECD Press Release,
SG/Press 94(36), Paris, May 27, 1994. See generally David Buchan & George
Graham, OECD Members Agree Action To Curb Bribery of Foreign Officials, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1994, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File;
OECD Agrees Code of Practice Against Corruption, REUTERS, Apr. 29, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File; George Graham, OECD to
Discuss Policy Against Bribery, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 6, available in
LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
7. Telephone Interview with Peter B. Clark, Esq., Deputy Chief, Fraud
Section, Criminal Division, Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C. (May 1995).
8. Bribonomics, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 86. See generally Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, Q.J. ECON. 599 (Aug. 1993).
9. See generally Barbara Ettorre, Why Overseas Bribery Won't Last, 83
MGMT. REV. 20 (June 1994), available in LEXIS, Lawrev Library, ALREV File.
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Fighters of corruption, such as former President Jimmy Carter,
were often ridiculed as "do gooders" who ignored the realities of
business. 10 Conventional wisdom dictated that attempting to
change business practices was the equivalent of Don Quixote tilting
at windmills. However, a new development may alter the business
landscape. Transparency International (TI), modeled on Amnesty
International, is dedicated to ending the inefficient and costly
system of bribery of foreign officials." This grass roots movement
by a non-governmental organization (NGO) represents an important philosophical shift on this issue. This thrust is coming from
those countries where bribery has been endemic and citizens can
appreciate the costs to their society. These costs can be seen in
poorly planned projects that serve to hide payoffs and in the large
foreign bank accounts of public officials. This shift from a moral
to an economic argument is a significant change that
may presage
12
corruption.
eliminate
to
effort
the
in
result
a better
This Article will examine the enforcement of the FCPA and
the erroneous perception that it is a "dead letter." The adoption
of the OECD Antibribery Recommendation and the utility of
voluntary codes will also be examined. The Article will conclude
with some recommendations for the future.
II.

The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

A. The Statute
The statute, as amended in 1988, applies to both the issuers of
securities under U.S. securities law and to domestic concerns,
defined as any:
individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States and any corporation, partnership, association, joint stock
company, business trust, unincorporated organization or sole
proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the

10. See generally Earle, supra note 3, at 551 & nn. 30-32.
11. For a discussion of Transparency International, see Michael Holman,
Survey of World Economy and Finance-Trade and the World Economy, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at XVIII [hereinafter TI]. The article discusses TI's
beginnings and its publication, THE GOOD BusINEss GUIDE To BRIBERY. Id.
TI, which publishes a quarterly newsletter, is based in Berlin and has other
chapters, including one in Washington, D.C. See also Robert Keatley, New
Agency Girds to Fight Corruption, Widespread in International Contracts, WALL
ST. J., May 21, 1993, at A6. See infra notes 119-21.
12. But see Frederick Stildemann, A Land Where Bribes are Tax-Deductible,
EUROPEAN, 17-23 June 1994, at 3.
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United States, or which is organized under the laws of a state
of the United States or a territory,
possession, or common13
wealth of the United States.
All of the above entities are prohibited from offering money, gifts,
promises, or anything of value, to any foreign official who assists in
obtaining or retaining business in a corrupt fashion.14
An exception exists for payments made for routine government
actions, which are defined as obtaining permits or government
documents to authorize one to do business, processing paper work,
obtaining visas, etc." Paying for police protection, mail pick-up,
inspections related to goods in transit across country, obtaining
phone service or utilities, and loading and unloading cargo are also
exempted.1 6 These activities are also distinguished from larger
governmental decisions to award contracts.17 Affirmative defenses
are available, e.g., if the action was legal in the host country, if it
was a bona fide business expenditure,
or if it involved the execution
18
contract.
a
of
performance
or
Under the FCPA, as amended, the U.S. Attorney General
(AG) was to consider issuing guidelines, but the current Attorney
General has determined that guidelines are unnecessary.19 The
law also provides a procedure for seeking opinions of the Attorney
General if there are questions about the application of the law to
specific instances.2' However, the official procedure is infrequently used.21 An Attorney General's opinion creates a rebuttable
presumption that the conduct, if the description was accurate and
if the company followed the AG's instruction, "is in conformity
with the Department of Justice's present enforcement policy."22
"Knowing" is a requirement for liability to be imposed under
the FCPA.2 It is defined as:

13.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (a), 78dd-2, 78ff (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

14.

Id.

15.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-

1 (f) (3)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (d), 78dd-2(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See Telephone
Interview with Peter B. Clark, supra, note 7.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (e), 78dd-2 (f). See 28 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1994). See infra
notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing opinion procedure).
21. Id
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(e)(1); 78dd-2(f)(1).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a)(3), (0(2); 78dd-2(a)(3), (h)(3).
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such person is aware that such person is engaging in such
conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is
substantially certain to occur; or such person has a firm belief
that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially
certain to occur ... knowledge is established if a person is

aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstances unless the person actually believes that such circumstances do
not exist. 24
"Knowing" was amended from the original version which
The significance of the
merely required "reason to know."'
change may not have great practical impact other than the clear
statement that one has a defense if one truly did not know that the
payment was a bribe. However, willful blindness, or a wink and a
nod, will not be an excuse.2 6

B. Recent Enforcement
Ironically, some businesses erroneously believe that the FCPA
is a low priority for enforcement. In fact, Lockheed paid a $24.8
million fine. The company acknowledged wrongdoing in paying an
Egyptian legislator and her husband, via their consulting firm, a fee
for assisting Lockheed in securing the sale of three transport
planes. 27 It is reported that the figure includes a $21.8 million
dollar criminal fine and a $3 million dollar civil settlement. John
Davis, Chief of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney's office,
reported that it was the maximum fine, representing twice the
profit to Lockheed on the sale of its C-130 planes. Allegedly,
Lockheed had agreed to pay a $600,000 commission per plane to
the government official, Ms. Takla. However, after auditors
discovered the arrangement in 1989, Lockheed told the Pentagon
it would not pay the fee. Yet Lockheed paid a one million dollar
"termination fee" to Ms. Takla "in lieu of a commission after the
The indictment charged Lockheed paid Takla "for the
sale."'
purpose of inducing Takla to use her influence with the Egyptian
Government to direct business to defendant Lockheed." Lockheed's Director of Middle East and North African sales also
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f) (2) (A)(1), 2(B).
25. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78.99-1 (a) (3) (1981).
26. See Title V of the O.T.C.A. of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1415-25.
27. $24.8 Million Penalty Paid by Lockheed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1995, § 1,
at 35.
28. Id.
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pleaded guilty individually "to helping the company pay and
conceal the bribe."29 Another Lockheed executive, a regional vice
president, is a fugitive living in Syria.3"
The fine imposed on Lockheed certainly does not sound like
a paper tiger.3 The fine will not bankrupt large multinational
corporations, but rather, it should cause them to re-evaluate their
sales practices. Similarly, the vice president who is living in exile
is testimony to the impact of the FCPA.
Is it possible there was a legitimate question of the legality of
these payments? Was it an unfortunate consulting contract that
would have been legal but for the presence of the Egyptian
legislator who was a government official for FCPA purposes? Or
was the firm selected precisely for that connection, that it could
deliver the contracts? The sale, after all, involved $79 million
dollars in airplanes. The United States government believed there
made.32 The
was a strong case here and that no mistake was
33
regional sales director's plea buttresses this view.

The facts appeared less clear cut in an earlier plea agreement,
entered into by Young and Rubicam, the New York-based
advertising agency.34 The agency pled guilty in 1990 to a felony
and paid a $500,000 dollar fine." Executives of the fined company, hoping to secure a contract with the Jamaican Tourist Board,
hired a former head of the Ministry of Tourism. The former
minister allegedly funneled money to the current minister.3 6 The
agency pled guilty just before the trial began in federal district
court. One executive, whose statement was announced through
General Counsel, expressed his disdain for the proceedings,
"[H]aving just pled guilty to a felony in federal court, it's hard to
feel I have a complete victory, but it is pretty damned close ...
29.

Id.

30. Id.
31. See AM. HERITAGE DICIONARY (2d ed. 1991) (referring to one who
seems outwardly powerful but is in fact impotent and weak). The Chinese Leader,
Mao Tse-Tung often used this phrase when referring to the United States
following World War II.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Joanne Lipman, Young and Rubicam Pleads Guilty to Settle JamaicaCase,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1990, at B4 [hereinafter Lipman, Young and Rubicam];
Joanne Lipman, Indictment Charges Young & Rubicam, 2 Top Aids Bribed

JamaicanOfficals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1989, § 6, at 5. For text of the indictment
and for preliminary motions, see United'States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F.
Supp. 334 (D.Conn. 1990).

35. See Lipman, Young and Rubicam, supra note 34.
36.

Id.
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(this) is the most metaphysical felony I've ever pleaded guilty
to."' 37 The agency maintained that they had hired an agent who
was not a foreign official, but an employee who simply lobbied on
their behalf." Young and Rubicam argued that any violation of
the FCPA was unintentional and de minimis. Perhaps their
position was a natural attempt to put a positive spin on otherwise
bad news. This case underscores the necessity of carefully choosing
international business agents. Ignorance and willful blindness will
not be a defense to FCPA violations.
Another recent plea-bargained case illustrates the perilous
waters of not only securing international contracts, but also of
collecting payment on existing contracts. Vitusa Corporation, a
New Jersey company, pled guilty in 1994 to a violation of the
FCPA.39 Denny Herzberg was the President and sole shareholder
of the company. Vitusa entered into a contract with a Dominican
Republic company, Horizontes Dominicanos. ° Horizontes was to
act as Vitusa's broker for the sale of milk powder to the government of the Dominican Republic. 41 Servio Tulio Mancebo owned
Horizontes. 42 Vitusa entered into a contract in 1989 to sell 1,500
metric tons of milk powder at $2,200 per metric ton for a total
price of $3.3 million dollars (U.S.). 43 Vitusa agreed to pay a
commission of $102 per metric ton - a standard industry commission.' The Dominican Republic government (DR) was obligated
to pay within 60 days of delivery or else pay interest at the rate of
prime plus one percent on the balance due.45
Vitusa shipped 870 metric tons between 1989 and 1990 in three
shipments for a total of $1,914,000 due.' The DR government

37.

Id.

38. Id.
39. See United States v. Vitusa Corp., 3 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep.
(Business Laws, Inc.) 699.155-699.175 (1994) [hereinafter FCPA Rep.]. The
corporation, Vitusa, and its president, Mr. Herzberg, entered into a plea bargain.
There was a difference noted between the Government's position on the fine

range ($163,000-$326,000) and Vitusa's ($12,000-24,000). Vitusa was fined $20,000.
Mr. Herzberg was placed on 2 years probation and fined $5,000, to be applied to

the $20,000 fine. Telephone Interview with Clerk's Office, U.S. District Court,
New Jersey, Case No. 94-254 (July 1995).
40. Vitusa, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.162.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Vitusa, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.162.
46. Id.
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paid $1,762,750. 47 Vitusa shipped the final three lots by May 1990
under pressure from the government to release the milk without
immediate payment due to, the upcoming election.48 Herzberg did
49
so based on the promise that payment would be forthcoming.
As of November 1990, the DR government had paid $2,384,580 of
the $3.3 million dollar contract price and still owed $1 million in
principal and interest." No further payments were made until July
1991 despite the DR's acknowledgement that it owed Vitusa the
money.51
Mr. Herzberg tried letters and phone calls to collect the past
due money.52 He also appealed to U.S. government officials as
well as the President of the DR to assist.53 Herzberg continued
54
to talk to Mancebo about how he could collect the money.
According to the information filed:
[a]t some point in these discussions, Mancebo communicated to
Herzberg a demand made by a senior official in the Dominican
government. This demand called for a payment of a "service
fee" to a senior official of the Dominican Republic in return for
the official using that official's influence to obtain the balance
due to Vitusa for the milk powder contract.55
In the interim the government paid $400,000 in July and September
1991.56

In August 1992, Herzberg agreed to Mancebo's proposal.57
The balance due was $163,000. Herzberg faxed a letter to a DR
bank instructing them to accept payment from the government on
his behalf and to transfer $50,000 to Mancebo and transmit the rest
to his company.59 On August 11, 1992, the DR government
transmitted $100,000 to the bank of which $30,000 was credited to
Mancebo and $70,000 was credited to Vitusa. 6

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 699.162-699.163.
Id. at 699.163.
Id.
Vitusa, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.163.
Id.
Id.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55.

Vitusa, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.163.

56. Id.
57.

Id.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60.

Vitusa, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.164.

1996]

THE MONEY ARGUMENT

Five days after payment, Herzberg spoke to a U.S. embassy
official and related the request that had been made for a service
fee.61 One day later the same U.S. official faxed Herzberg that
the service fee payment would violate the FCPA.62 Herzberg
replied on August 24, 1992 that he agreed and had already made
a decision.63 By this time payment of the $30,000 service fee was
made.'
On September 3, 1992 the DR paid $63,905.12 and the bank
according to Herzberg's instructions, withheld $20,000 of this
amount and transferred it to Mancebo's account.65 The U.S.
government charged that:
Vitusa authorized, promised, and offered payment of the money
that is "service fees" totalling all or a portion of the $50,000 to
the senior official, indirectly, through an associate, while
knowing that all or a portion of the money would be given to
the foreign official for the purpose of inducing the official to
use that official's position and influence with the Government
of the Dominican Republic in order to obtain and retain
business, that is full payment of the balance due for Vitusa's
prior sale of milk powder ....

Vitusa was placed on two years probation and was levied a $5,000
personal fine and a $20,000 corporate fine.67 The personal fine
was to be applied to the corporate fine. Thus, the total fine was
$20,000.68
This case should serve as a wake up call to businesses who
might consider a fee to secure payment of an executed contract as
nothing more than discounting a bill for collection. However, the
U.S. government considers such payments illegal and the penalty
underscores their view. The penalty levied in Vitusa may seem
mild in comparison to the Lockheed or Young & Rubicam cases,
but note that Mr. Herzberg now has a criminal record. Although
he shares that distinction with such illustrious figures as Michael
Milken and Spiro Agnew, it is a criminal record nonetheless.

61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.

64. Id.
65.

Vitusa, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.164.

66. Id.
67.

Id.

68. Id.
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C. Cases
In several recent cases, the defendants were apparently
unwilling to plea bargain. In one instance, Richard Liebo, an
aerospace executive, was convicted for violating the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA and for making a false statement to the
government. 69 He was acquitted on seventeen other counts.7 °
He appealed his convictions and was granted a new trial in 1991.71
Liebo was vice-president of the Aerospace division of NAPCO
International, a military equipment company located in Minnesota.72 In 1983, NAPCO was sought out to assist a West German
company, Dornier, in refurbishing C-130 cargo planes for the
country of Niger.73 Liebo and Axel Kurth, a Dornier sales
representative, flew to Niger to seek the President of Niger's
approval of their contract.74 They met first with Captain Ali
Tiemogo, chief of maintenance for the Niger Air Force.75 Kurth
and Liebo told Tiemogo that they would "make some gestures"
towards him if he helped get this contract approved.76 Following
Tiemogo's recommendation, the President signed the contract.77
Liebo then met with Tiemogo's cousin, Tahirou Barke, who
worked at the Niger Embassy in Washington, D.C.78 Liebo mentioned the "gesture" and asked the cousin to open a bank account
in the United States.79 With Barke's help, Liebo opened an
account in Minnesota in the name E. Dave.8" NAPCO deposited
about $30,000, which the cousin used to pay bills."1 The cousin
also gave a portion of the money to Tiemogo.82 In 1985 the
cousin, Barke, told Liebo he was returning to Niger to be married.83 Liebo made the flight arrangements and paid for Barke's

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1309, 1314.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1309.

75. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1309.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 1309-10.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
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airline tickets which cost $2,028, by charging them to NAPCO's
Diner's Club account."
NAPCO received two other contracts from Niger totalling over
$2,550,000.85 NAPCO paid $130,000 to other "commission agents"
Tiemogo's brother-in-law, Tiemogo's sister-in-law, and Tiemogo's cousin's girlfriend. 6 At Tiemogo's request, the sister-in-law
and brother-in-law set up bank accounts in Paris.' None of these
parties, however,88received the commission checks or acted as
NAPCO's agents.
In accord with U.S. government defense security requirements,
Liebo certified that "no rebates, gifts or gratuities have been given
contrary to United States law to officers, officials or employees" of
the Niger government.8 9 He also certified that NAPCO's commission agent under the contract was Amidou Mailele (Tiemogo's
brother-in-law), and that he would be paid $47,662.'
At trial, Liebo was acquitted of all charges except for the
purchase of the airline tickets and the related false statement
count.91 He challenged the conviction based on the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA, on the basis of the airline tickets Liebo
argued that there was insufficient evidence the tickets were "given
to obtain or retain business," and that there was no evidence to
show that his gift was made "corruptly. 9 2 In reviewing the
conviction, and Liebo's motion for a new trial, the appeals court
noted that a reasonable jury could "conclude that the gift was given
'
to obtain or retain business."93
However, Liebo argued that "corruptly" means that the offer,
payment or gift must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse
his official position.94 Liebo asserted that he intended the tickets
to be a personal gift to the cousin, and therefore, were not given
with corrupt intent. The court, however, dismissed his argument:95

84.

Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1310.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

89.

Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1310.

90. Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.
Sess. 1
95.

Id.
Id. at 1310-11.
Id. at 1311.
Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1312. See generally S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1312.
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We are satisfied that sufficient evidence existed from which a
reasonable jury could find that the airline tickets were given
"corruptly." For example, Liebo gave the airline tickets to
Barke shortly before the third contract was approved. In
addition, there was undisputed evidence concerning the close
relationship between Tiemogo and Barke and Tiemogo's
important role in the contract approval process. There was also
testimony that Liebo classified the airline ticket for accounting
purposes as a "commission payment." This evidence could
allow a reasonable jury to infer that Liebo gave the tickets to
Barke intending to influence the Niger government's contract
approval process. We conclude, therefore, that a reasonable
jury could find that Liebo's gift to Barke was given "corruptly."
Accordingly, sufficient evidence existed to support Liebo's
conviction.'
Next, Liebo claimed that the lower court erred by refusing to
give his jury instructions distinguishing a "gift or gratuity," from a
bribe.97 The court upheld as adequate the following instruction
that:
"[c]orruptly" meant that the offer, promise to pay, payment, or
authorization of payment, must be intended to induce the
recipient to misuse his official position or to influence someone
else to do so and that "an act is 'corruptly' done if done
voluntarily [a]nd intentionally, and with a bad purpose of
accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end
or result by some unlawful method or means."98
A new trial was eventually granted due to newly discovered
evidence in the form of a memo. The memo surfaced two months
after trial and showed that Henri Jacob, NAPCO's corporate
president, approved the charge of the airline tickets to the NAPCO
Diner's Club account.99 Liebo pointed to the fact that during
deliberations the jury had asked for information about "[a]ny
information regarding authorization for payment of wedding trip."

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1312-14. See United States v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 1078, 1084 (8th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984) (motions for a new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence are not favored, and decisions will not be reversed
absent a clear abuse of discretion). The Liebo court granted a new trial on such
grounds, however, because it considered the evidence against Liebo weak. 923
F.2d at 1313-14.
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In another case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that foreign
officials who accepted a bribe could not be prosecuted under the
FCPA, since the act does not criminalize the receipt of a bribe by
foreign officials.1" The court further concluded that the foreign
officials could not be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the
FCPA.' 0 ' The result reflects a common sense limit on the extraterritorial application of the FCPA.' °
The Third Circuit considered an FCPA case as well. At issue
was a contract with the Republic of Nigeria to construct an aeromedical facility. Two U.S. corporations, Environmental Tectonics
(ETC) and W.S. Kirkpatrick competed for the project. 3 After
the contract was awarded to Kirkpatrick, ETC alleged that it was
The United States, having
procured on the basis of fraud."
established evidence of illegal payment of commissions to Panamanian entities controlled by a Nigerian citizen prosecuted Kirkpatrick
officials. 5 The defendants pled guilty to violating the FCPA,
were fined, and sentenced to community service.1 0 6
The facts of Kirkpatrick also gave rise to charges of racketeering." However, the defendants asserted that the "act of state"
doctrine barred judicial determination of such claims."° The case
reached the Supreme Court on the last issue, wherein Justice Scalia
flatly dismissed the defendants' invocation of the act of state
doctrine because U.S. courts were not required to decide "the

100. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 832-36.
103. Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp.
1381, 1385 (D.N.J. 1987), affd in part,rev'd in part and remanded,847 F.2d 1052

(3d Cir. 1988).
104. Id. at 1054-56.
105. Id. at 1055-57.
106. Id. at 1056.
107. Kirkpatrick, 847 F.2d at 1052. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968 (19886 Supp. V 1993) (making it
unlawful to receive income from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt); New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act, N.J. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 2C: 41-1 -2C: 41-6 (West 1994) (bribery and the acceptance of a bribe by
a government official are illegal under Nigerian Law). See Kirkpatrick, 847 F.2d
1052, 1056 n.4.
108. This is a judicial doctrine which precludes a court from inquiry into
sovereign acts that would result in embarrassment to the sovereign, or would
constitute interference in U.S. foreign policy. It is not construed as a rule of
abstention; rather it is a rule of decision that the acts of foreign sovereigns within
their own jurisdictions are deemed valid. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304
(1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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effect of official action by a foreign sovereign."" In other words,
the question of the legality of the Nigerian contract is simply not
the issue before the U.S. courts and so there was "no occasion to
apply the0 rule of decision that the act of state doctrine re'1
quires."'
The above mentioned cases illustrate that the FCPA is still
very much alive and can cause difficulty even where businessmen
believe that none exist. Whether in trying to secure payment for
goods already delivered, or simply making "gifts" of airline tickets,
unwary businesspeople need to be forewarned.
D. Opinion Procedure
In 1992, the U.S. Justice Department adopted rules for the
FCPA opinion procedure which replaced the FCPA review
procedure in place since 1980.111 The new procedures are in
accord with the 1988 changes in the FCPA brought about by the
OTCA.12 The purpose of the opinion procedure is to enable
companies to obtain a before the fact opinion from the Attorney
General as to whether certain conduct conforms with current policy
regarding the antibribery provisions of the FCPA. 113 There were
twenty opinions released between 1980 and 1989.11' Under the
new procedures, it is now clear that supporting documents are
unreachable by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, and
that the
U.S. Attorney General must issue an opinion within 30
5
days."1

One of the recent FOIA releases involved a joint venture with
the Government of Pakistan for petroleum exploration and production. The company wanted to spend money on training for
government officials as required by Pakistani law." 6 The company sought review for the payment of training expenses that

109. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
406 (1990) (per curiam).
110. Id.
111. See 57 Fed. Reg. 39,600 (1992), codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 80) (1994); cf 45
Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (establishing previous FCPA review procedures).

112. See supra note 3.
113.

See 28 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1994) (setting forth FCPA Opinion Procedure).

114. See 3 FCPA Rep. at 700.02.
115. 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.8, 80.14 (1994).
116. Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act. Rev. Rel. No. 92-1, 3 FCPA Rep. at 725-26
(Feb. 1992).
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amounted to over $250,000.117 The Department took no enforce-

ment action.11
In another release, the Department considered a joint venture
between a U.S. company and an entity wholly owned and supervised by a former Eastern bloc country. The agreement placed
foreign officials on the board of directors of the joint venture. The
officials were to be paid a Director's fee of approximately $1,000
per month. 9 The fees were ultimately to be reimbursed from
was
This transaction
the foreign partner's share of profits."
121
deemed acceptable, and no enforcement action was taken.
In yet another instance, a company wished to sell military
equipment to a foreign government-owned entity. The U.S.
company represented that it would pay commissions directly to the
foreign country's treasury' 2 Thus, the company would not be
making payments to government owned businesses or to foreign
officials. The department took no enforcement action. 123
Despite improvements in the opinion procedure, businesses
seem to prefer relying on the advice of private counsel to negotiate
the maze of permissible and impermissible payments. This procedure is reminiscent of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy on homosexuals in the military. 24 Lack of requests may also signal a deep
distrust of governmental efforts to be helpful.
III. The Economics of Bribery or "Bribonomics"
Many Americans think that the only way to do business
overseas is to bribe. 2 While it is clearly illegal in the United
States to bribe domestic officials in order to be selected for a
117. Id.
118. Id. at 726.
119. Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rev. Rel. No. 93-1, 3 FCPA Rep. at 726 (Apr.
20, 1993).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act. Rev. Rel. No. 93-2, 3 FCPA Rep. at 727 (May
11, 1993).
123. Id.

124. National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C.
§ 654 (1994), Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1670 (1994). See generally Dep't of
Def. Dir. 1332.14 (1994); Jerry Seper, U.S. Will Appeal 'Don'tAsk' Ruling; Judge
Found Policy Unconstitutional,WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at A6.

125. This is a belief held by many but not easily documented, because business
people do not want to acknowledge violating the law. However, it is interesting
to note that one hotelier, requesting anonymity, stated that he would not invest

in certain areas of the world because of his distaste for the endemic practice of
bribery.
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contract, some businessmen believe in the old adage "when in
Rome, do as the Romans do." Thus, many Americans assume that
anything goes overseas. This is not bad advice if it means following
local custom, but it is seriously off the mark if it means ignoring the
law. Assuming that the host country expects these payments, and
they do no harm, is not entirely true. The "don't ask, don't tell"
policy will not be a successful corporate strategy, as Lockheed
found out recently.126
The perception that bribery is acceptable in many countries is
not accurate. Attitudes overseas are changing."2 Gary Edwards,
a consultant, notes that "some Asian nationals are telling us that in
many of their markets, that (bribery) is not necessary. The practice
is increasingly viewed as unacceptable and destructive to their
economies."" 8 The reason corruption is costly to economic
development is twofold. First, with a weak central government,
bribes will drive the cumulative burden on private agents into
infinity. Second, there are "distortions entailed by the necessary
secrecy of corruption."129 Corruption shifts the resources of a
country from "highest value" projects like clean water, etc., to
potentially useless projects wherein the individual may secretly
profit.'o "The demands of secrecy can also cause leaders of a
country to maintain monopolies to prevent entry, and to discourage
innovation by outsiders if expanding the ranks of the elite can
expose existing corruption practices."'131 The reason that bribery

encourages larger projects is, as one writer said, "[tihe bigger the
' 32
cake, the less a few stolen crumbs matter.'
A recent study appearing in The Economist magazine
correlates the incidence of corruption, with the growth of the
nation's gross domestic product (GDP):

126. See supra notes 27-30, 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing Lockheed
case).

127. See Ettorre, supra note 9, at *4.
128. Id.
129. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 8, at 616.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.

132. Bribonomics, supra note 8, at 86.
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HIGH CORRUPTION

Nigeria
Venezuela
Philippines
Russia

ANNUAL AVERAGE
GROWTH OF GDP (1984-1993)

4%
3%
1%
-4%

MIDDLE CORRUPTION

China
Malaysia
Japan
Brazil

10%
6%
4%
2%

Low CORRUPTION

Taiwan
Singapore
United States
Germany

8%
7%
3%

3%133

Note that low corruption does not necessarily tie into highest
GDP growth, but high corruption precludes high growth. The
anomaly of China, which ranked with middle corruption but high
growth, may be explained by several factors. One factor is the
dramatic transformation of China's economy and its high degree of
control, thus, China has avoided problems that have occurred in
Russia.

4

Bribery is anti-democratic in that, when unchecked, it may
destabilize a society and actually encourage a return to dictatorship
as a method of controlling corruption. 135 If capitalism and bribery
are viewed as handmaidens, then economic democracy may be
endangered, and likewise, political democracy.
The research linking bribery with poor economic development
may be the best argument for those countries which, heretofore,
have campaigned for an end to bribery. However, the question
remains whether those countries will be able to end the entrenched
practice by themselves. For, if a company is willing to offer a large
sum of money to secure a contract, there may be only a handful of
officials who are not tempted by such payment as a kind of pension
or government contingency plan. Thus, individual or national
strength to resist accepting bribes will not be sufficient. Companies
must stop offering if bribery is ever to end.
133.

Id.

134. Id.
135. Id.
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IV. International Response
A. Call to Universalize the FCPA
When the FCPA was passed in 1977, many people in the
United States thought that other countries would enact similar
legislation. Other countries did not follow suit for a host of
reasons. Moral and ethical arguments did not persuade them to
abandon their apparent tolerance of the practice. 13 6 The U.S.
interest in this legislation, fueled in part by moral indignation
growing out of the Watergate revelations of international slush
funds, was also driven by the practical concern of promoting
competition. 37 Competition is distorted when two U.S. companies bid on a project, and a bribing company is selected over a nonbribe offering company.
The FCPA's 1988 amendments addressed Congress' concern
that it needed to monitor whether foreign countries were committed to the eradication of bribery, and whether American businesses
were being hindered by the FCPA requirements.13 Many people
assumed that because the 1988 amendments made it easier for
business to operate by clarifying that some payments were acceptable, the next step could be a complete repeal of the FCPA.
However, that has not occurred.139
The International Agreement Negotiations Report to Congress
included in the OTCA stated in part:
[i]t is the sense of the Congress that the President should
pursue the negotiation of an international agreement, among
the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development to govern persons from those countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic
concerns by the amendments made by this section. Such

136. See Jeffrey A. Fadiman, A Traveler's Guide To Gifts and Bribes, HARV.
BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1986, at 122.
137. See Eric L. Hirschhorn, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrowed,
Significantly Clarified, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 1988-Jan. 2, 1989, at 16 (asserting that
FCPA was enacted in post-Watergate atmosphere and following disclosure of
large-scale payments by U.S. firms to foreign officials); Stephen Kurkjian & John
Kelly, The Meese Case and A Little-Used Law on Bribes Abroad, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 3, 1988, at 3 (noting that "in the decade since the statute was passed only 10
cases have been prosecuted against companies charged with bribing foreign
officials.").
138. Hirschhorn, supra note 137.
139. See supra notes 27-111 and accompanying text (discussing FCPA cases).
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international agreement should include a process by which
problems and conflicts associated with such acts could be
resolved.'"

There is no evidence or report of any agreement on this
issue.'
In 1994, under a different U.S. President, the OECD
adopted an international Anti-bribery Recommendation by member
states, who are in turn urged
to implement the recommendation
142
law.
national
own
their
into
B. OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation
The OECD was founded to rebuild the economies of Europe.
The OECD expanded in 1961 beyond Europe to become a forum
for coordinating assistance to developing countries. 143 Its commitment to the creation and support of market economies has

enhanced the security ties between many of its members.'"
In 1994, the OECD Council adopted a recommendation on
bribery for international business transactions that may be found in
Appendix A. The Council defined bribery as "the direct or indirect
offer or provision of any undue pecuniary or other advantage to or
for a foreign public official, in violation of the official's legal duties,
145
in order to obtain or retain business.,
Note the use of the word "undue." This is, seemingly, a
recognition of gift-giving and other courtesies between business
partners that is not addressed by U.S. law.'"
The OECD's Antibribery Recommendations, which are not
legally binding, encourage member countries to criminalize the
making of bribes to foreign public officials. 147 Japan, with the
backing of its European colleagues, objected to U.S. efforts to
make the recommendation legally binding.' 48 One reporter noted
that, "[a]lthough Japan is unlikely to amend its criminal laws, the
OECD's recommendations will force the Japanese government to
140. OTCA, supra note 3, Title V, Subtitle A, Part I, § 5003 (d), 102 Stat. 1424.
141. See Telephone Interview with Peter B. Clark, supra note 7.
142. See infra notes 143-153 and accompanying text.
143. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, U.S. Dep't
of State Dispatch, Vol. 5, (No. 25), June 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MAJPAP File.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
146. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78n, 78t, 78dd-1, dd-2, 78ff.
147. OECD Eyes Criminal Charges For Foreign Graft, JiJi Press Ticker Serv.,
June 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
148. Id.
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bear moral responsibilities for overseeing the conduct of Japanese
companies operating overseas."149
An antibribery working group within the OECD has been
established to follow up on the Antibribery Recommendation. 5 °
The group met in the autumn of 1994, which led to a symposium
in March, 1995.151 The group prepared a list of questions for
which the member countries were to respond. Several have done
so. Another working group was scheduled for June, 1995.52

The U.S. Secretary of State, Warren M. Christopher, has
complained that U.S. companies are losing hundreds of millions of
dollars in contracts every year because they are unable to
bribe.'53 Yet, this is not prompting for calls of repeal of the
FCPA.
C. Europeans Acknowledge The Threat of Bribery
Until recently, European governments were no more receptive
to acceptance of laws such as those modeled on the FCPA than
were many nationals from developing countries." 4 One reason
for this posture is, perhaps, nationalism. There were rarely two
French or two German companies bidding against each other on
the same foreign contract. Therefore, a bribe might have meant
the difference between whether the French or the German firm
secured the contract.
However, recent events reflected in the headline "Europe in
the Grip of Corruption Plague" suggest a continent confronting the
economic consequences of bribery.155 Today, there is more talk
of the issue because firms and governments are beginning to realize
that market corruption may be costly to economic development.156 Perhaps the nascence of capitalism and the spread of
corruption on such a large scale in Russia and newly independent
states are forcing many countries to take a serious look at a bribery
practices previously ignored.157

149. Id.
150. See Telephone Interview with Peter B. Clark, supra note 7.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Graham, supra note 6, at 6.
154. See generally Buchan & Graham, supra note 6, at 2.
155. See Stuidemann, supra note 12 (editorial heading in news article). See
generally Bribonomics, supra note 8.
156. See Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 8, at 605, 609-10, 615-16.
157. Rosie Waterhouse, War Declared on Corruption, INDEP. (London), June
5, 1994, at 7.
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Twenty billion U.S. dollars are reportedly held in Swiss bank
accounts for leaders of African states.'58 This is a reflection of
the costs of bribery and who benefits. The clear loser is the firm
who bid unsuccessfully and the country and citizens in which the
firm is based. 59
The thirty-two-member Council of Europe met in June 1994
to discuss ways to fight corruption. Mr. Roberto Lamponi, a
Council Legal affairs expert, stated:
Up until recently people knew corruption existed but didn't see
it as a problem of society. Now it is obvious there's a major
problem with clear international implications ...

With the

collapse of communism, the great presence of the state has
vanished in the east, leaving every little official who holds a
portion of power tempted to exploit it for his own personal

gain.16

This evidence of the changing climate in Europe sends a positive
signal that the continent may be ready to embrace some of the
changes proposed by the OECD.
D. Governmental Codes

On March 27, 1995, the Clinton Administration released its
Model Business Principles designed to be a voluntary guide for
corporations doing business abroad.161 One newspaper noted the
curious circumstances of the Code's release because:
the code was unveiled with little apparent pride of authorship.
It was released to a small group of reporters on Friday afternoon before the holiday weekend by three mid-level officials
who insisted their names not be used. The release took place
at the Commerce Department, at a safe distance from the

158. Id.
159. Justice Ministers to Review Anti-Corruption Drive, Reuters World Serv.,
June 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
160. International Trade, White House Initiates Consultations on Voluntary
Code for FirmsAbroad, Daily Rep; for Exec. (BNA) No. 59 d 16 (Mar. 28, 1996),
available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
161. Robert Greenberger, Administration's New Business Code Timed to
Renewal of China Trade Status, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at A3. At the time
these principles were announced it was impossible to find anyone in the
Commerce Department who knew anything about them or would speak about
them. To say they were played in a "low key" way by the administration, is an
understatement.
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White House,.and was printed on a plain piece of paper without
any U.S. government identification. 62

.

There is no enforcement mechanism, only a "best practices
award" for companies, nor is there any legislative monitoring. The
Code itself is based upon 5 principles:
1. provision of a safe and healthy workplace;
2. fair employment practices including avoidance of child and
forced labor, avoidance of discrimination based on race, gender,
national origin or religious beliefs, respect for the right of
association, and the right to organize and bargain collectively;
3. responsible environmental protection and environmental
practices;
4. compliance with U.S. and local laws promoting good
business practices including laws prohibiting illicit payments and
ensuring fair competition;
5. maintenance through leadership at all levels of a corporate
culture that respects free expression consistent with legitimate
business concerns and does not condone political coercion in
the workplace that encourages good corporate citizenship and
makes a positive contribution to the communities in which the
company operates and where ethical conduct is recognized,
valued, and exemplified by all employees."
Most significantly, this statement of principles is not intended for
legislation.
This voluntary code of conduct is an attempt by the Clinton
administration to follow up on its promise of 1994. After separating the issues of human rights from that of most favored nation
a
trading status in June 1994, the U.S. promised to announce 164
business code that would apply to businesses not just in China.
President Clinton had argued that China had been unfairly targeted
by human rights groups and that a more evenhanded policy would

162. Id.
163. See HRW/Asia Comments on White House Business Principles, Human
Rights Watch/Asia Release, Mar. 27, 1995; see also George Graham, US Code For
Business Abroad 'Disappointing', FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 1995, at 4;
Matthew Quinn, Business Report on Internationalbusiness, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Apr. 11, 1995, at D2; The Beijing Duck; What U.S. Firms in China Don't Do for
Human Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1995, at Cl; James Finefrock, Clinton Wimps
Out, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 30, 1995, at A20; A. M. Rosenthal, Flogging China
With A Limp U.S. Noodle, INT. HER. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1995, at 4, available in
LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
164. See Quinn, supra note 163.
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make more sense.1" China is not the only country with a problematic human rights record and, thus, should not be singled out
for negative economic treatment.
The principles make reference to bribery, as well as environmental sensitivity and compliance with labor standards."6 However, it is a toothless, clawless, and, arguably, a comatose tiger.
The code will no doubt anger many activists. It will not serve as a
palliative for China watchers. It will serve only business interests,
which are pleased that they do not have another government
agency to contend with in competing for overseas business.
The principles are deliberately vague.1 67 Is there a commitment to first-world environmental standards even though they may
not be required? Free expression? Does that mean cooperation
with the enforcement of China's one child policy? Avoidance of
forced or child labor? What does "child" mean? Both the
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch groups expressed
disappointment in the principles.1"
One might draw a parallel to the Sullivan Principles for doing
business in South Africa.169 Within apartheid, companies that
adopted the Principles committed to equal opportunity and affirmative action, and so recruited and trained minorities. 7 ° Nonetheless, when apartheid had not ended, other groups called for
corporate withdrawal from South Africa to economically force a
more rapid transformation to a democratic country.17 1 Many
165. See Rosenthal, supra note 163.
166. See
167. See
168. See
Sentencing

supra note 163 and accompanying text.
Finefrock, supra note 163.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994) and the Federal
Guidelines promulgated thereunder. As one attorney commented,

"[t]he line between unlawful and unethical is constantly changing, so you can't say
that what we think is lawful today won't be the subject of a prosecution the
following year." See Rorie Sherman, Ethicists: Gurus Of The '90's, NAT'L L.J.,

Jan. 24, 1994, at 1, 30. See also JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES; PREVENTING
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY (1993). For a discussion of corporate codes of
conduct and their utility, see Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing
Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 78 GEO. LJ. 1559 (1990).

169. Mr. Leon H. Sullivan, formerly a minister, and General Motors Director,
is an international business diplomat and widely known for authoring the
Principles in 1977. They are voluntary guidelines for U.S. trade with the
apartheid-era South Africa and encourage the fair treatment of black employees.
170. See Craig Matters, A Troubled Land Worries Business, 5 Intercorp (No.
16) 1 (1986), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File (stating purposes,
as well as listing Principles).
171. Id.; see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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companies, for both ethical and business reasons (fearing negative
publicity and consumer boycott), did leave South Africa until
apartheid was dismantled. 172 These same companies are now
returning - hoping to help and to profit from the momentous task
of rebuilding South Africa and implementing democracy. Unfortunately, the dismantling of apartheid only signalled the need to
begin tackling the resulting social problems. The immediate short
term problems are very real - providing housing and food,
education and a job for the blacks whose expectations are raised by
Mandela's election. Failure to deliver could be catastrophic. Just
as the Sullivan Principles encouraged companies to do that which
they were not required to do in South Africa, so, too, do the model
principles exhort businesses to do more than they are legally
required to do.
The Principles also reiterate that businesses will comply with
laws and abstain from illicit payments.173 This is simply a restatement of existing FCPA law and an admonishment to obey the law.
An easier task certainly if other companies around the world
played by the same rules. The Principles alone will not alter
behavior that the law has not already changed.
E. Individual Company Codes
The Principles may encourage companies to articulate their
own codes for several reasons. First, they may be useful from a
public relations perspective. Second, an individual code may be
more palatable than a code drawn by an environmental group or
human rights group. Third, a code may be helpful in showing
efforts by the company to dissuade employees from breaking the
law and could be used by the company to lessen a fine should it be
convicted, then sentenced, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines."7
Levi Strauss is a good example. The company has recently
announced a Code entitled "Business Partner Terms of Engagement."' 5 The Code prohibits the use of child labor for its prod-

172. See Marjorie Hyer, Bishop Wants U.S. Firms to Train Pretoria Blacks;
Program for Post-Apartheid Period Urged, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1986, at A23;
Deirdre Wilson, Trustees vote for partialdivestment, UPI, Aug. 8, 1986, available
in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, ALLNWS File.
173. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
174. Ethical Shopping: Human Rights, ECONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at 58-59. As

a result of this discovery, Levi Strauss fired 5% of its 600 suppliers. Id. at 58.
175. See Appendix B.
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ucts by any of its business partners or sub-contractors.176

Levi

Strauss attempts to deal with the difficult issue of workplace
apprenticeship.177 While it allows for apprenticeship, it can not
be used as a subterfuge to get around the minimum age of
fourteen.
The Code was prompted in part by the embarrassment of the
company, when it was discovered to be bringing clothes from
factories in Saipan, where the workers were living in appalling
conditions.178 Peter Jacobi, now President of Levi's international
operations, stated, "If you don't contradict yourself, eventually
most employees

-

and contractors -

will know what to do

'
right."179

However, Jacobi may have realized
because it just feels
that it is easier to talk about implementing ethical policies than
achieving them. In December 1994, Levi Strauss was reportedly
employing fourteen year old girls for sixteen-hour work shifts in
Bangladesh. 1" Of course the dilemma exists that, if the children
are fired, where will they go? In most cases they do not return to
their parents and a comfortable carefree life. Rather they may go
on to a life of prostitution, or to jobs which pose even greater
health risks than the ones from which they were fired.'
The Levi Strauss code points to the clear deficiencies in the
U.S. Principles discussed previously. Nonetheless, a legitimate
question exists as to whether this should be the province of the
government, or left to the private initiative of companies such as
Levi Strauss. Remember, too, that the law as reflected in the
FCPA, reflects the legal minimum required. Levi Strauss is but
one example and many other companies have also announced
Codes of Conduct."s It is also important to note that neither
individual codes nor the U.S. Principles contain any enforcement
mechanism or external oversight.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Appendix B. See also BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF CHILDREN: THE
USE OF CHILD LABOR IN AMERICAN IMPORTS, (Dep't Labor, July 15, 1994).
181. For examples of codes from Smithkline Beckman, Rohm and Haas,
Midsize Oilfield Services, Bethlehem, Martin Marietta, Hoecht Celanese and
United Technology, see 3 FCPA Rep. at 1500.001-1584.
182. Introducing TI, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, May 1994, at 1.

232

F

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:2

The New Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) TransparencyInternational(TI)

Many individuals believed that neither governments nor
corporations alone could successfully grapple with the ethical
dilemmas faced in international business. Transparency International is a new (formed in 1993) NGO which is modeled on the
successful Amnesty International.1" It is based in Berlin, Germany, with other offices around the world, including Washington,
D.C."8 It is a grass roots organization with a mission to:
...curb corruption ...to establish and implement effective
laws, policies and anti-corruption programs ...to strengthen

public support and understanding for anti-corruption programs
and enhance public transparency and accountability in international business transactions and in the administration of public
procurement.lu
Ecuador has agreed to become a laboratory of sorts for TI
because of a recent problem with bribery which highlighted its
inefficiency and cost. Ecuador had selected a European contractor
to supply the country With locomotives. 6 However, those that
were purchased as a result of a bribe were too heavy, and did not
run on the rail lines.1" As a result of the shocking revelation of
the cost of bribery to the country, the Vice President of Ecuador,
Alberto Dahik, has signed on to the Board of Ti' Dr. Dahik
stated, "we will require chairmen or presidents of foreign companies which want to do business here - and our own people - to
sign written statements promising that there will be no bribes."
TI: reports that developing countries are asking for help in
eradicating bribery. If bribes are offered, many people who work
in government may not be able to resist given the uncertainty of
their own careers and governments. However, if companies were
not willing to offer bribes, then the corruption cycle would end.
Thus, TI hopes to encourage OECD efforts, private efforts and
government law revisions.
183.

Id.

184.
185.

Id.
Valeria Merino Dirani, Building Islands of Integrity-The EcuadorModel

After One Year, TI NEWSL., Mar. 1995, at 3-4.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. George Moody-Stuart, Grand Corruption in Third World Development,
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, Jan. 1994, at 5-8.
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A March 1995 editorial in the TI Newsletter stated:
The German public woke up in January to find that they
had at home a situation which many believed could only exist
elsewhere: One of systemic corruption, of kickbacks on public
contracts or public servants, and the whole exercise being
underwritten by the taxpayer through tax deductible bribes. It
is a situation that should not have surprised them. We have
noted previously that countries of the North can no longer
preach against corruption to the rest of the world from a
position of presumed superiority. Rather the very society will
be as corrupt as its institutions and practices allow. This
practice is fortified and sustained by apologists who claim that
if the state seeks to tax illegal income it must also allow the
offsetting of illegal expenditures. This simply does not stand
scrutiny... Perhaps then there is a more compelling case than
had been realized in favor of the industrialized countries
tackling corruption in international business transactions straightforward self-interest.'89
Identification of self-interest is a motivation to stop corruption,
rather than just a moral or ethical argument. The identification
offers some hope that the rest of the world may now be concerned
about this spreading cancer.
George Moody-Stuart, who formerly worked in agri-business
in Africa and now works for TI, details the mechanics of grand
corruption and its pervasiveness in the 1990s. He found a correlation between the size of a project and the corruption that ensues.1" Mr. Moody-Stuart has identified a matrix of attractiveness of types of contracts from the point of view of the person
soliciting a bribe based upon size, immediacy and mystification.
The larger the project and the more technical and obscure it is, the
easier it is to obfuscate the payment of bribes.

189. Peter Eigen, Editorial, TI Newsl., TRANSPARENCY INT'L, Mar. 1995, at 1.
190. Id. at 8. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (discussing similar
findings reported in THE ECONOMIST).
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TI has received support from the Ford Foundation and now
has chapters formed or forming in forty countries."' The World
Bank has also joined in these efforts because many countries rely
on it for external aid."9 For example, it was reported that 90%
of the Mozambique budget was paid in bribes to civil servants, even
though 98% of GNP comes from foreign aid. 93 Thus, external
funding sources should care about how their money is spent and
194
what effect they are having on the development of the country.
H. Resistance to Change

All the developments at the private, government and NGO
level still have not resulted in any universal agreement or movement on legislation nationally or internationally. In Germany,
bribes are listed as a business expense so long as the person paid
is named.195 Joachim Grunewald, Germany's State Secretary of
Finance, stated that the prohibition of payments, "would damage
German firms in the international market and threaten jobs...
The federation of German Industry, the BDI, disputes that
...payments should even be considered corrupt. They are not

191. See Advisory Council Bulletin, TI, Sept. 1994 (noting support of Ford
Foundation); TI National Chapters Bulletin, TI, Dec. 1994 (listing accredited
chapters in formation).
192. See Advisory Council Bulletin, supra note 191.
193. See TI Newsletter, TI, Mar. 1995, at 5.
194. See Stfidemann, supra note 12, at 3.
195. Id.
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bribes at all, a spokesman maintained, described them rather
quaintly as 'marketing costs."' 1 96

Japan, likewise, seems uninterested in moving to criminalize
payments outside of Japan. 97 There is a reluctance to borrow
too heavily from an American legal system which is perceived as
exaggerated, costly and burdensome to business.
V.

Conclusion

The historic approach of dealing with bribery and corruption
from a moral perspective has not been effective in either generating
an international dialogue or effecting international change.
Although as Frank Vogl, a TI executive and head of Vogl Communications noted, "The corruption issue is human rights and, very
'
secondarily, business costs."198

Mr. Vogl added that "[m]ajor

multinationals have not understood that the whole value system of
dealing with developing countries is changing radically and rapidly.
These countries are becoming more open societies. The colonial
mind set of. bribery-as-usual is coming under greater risk for
bribers." However, the business cost issue is one that may capture
the world's attention.
Bribery seemed to be an entrenched practice in the third
world. Yet, as the economics of bribery are explored and the costs
are exposed, not just moral indignation, but rather international
attention will begin to focus on the problem. If bribery is brought
home to the northern hemisphere countries, where the costs of
corruption may be felt domestically and deemed intolerable in a
free society, change may be possible.
The OECD Antibribery Recommendation is a first step. NGO
pressure by the World Bank and TI may help, as well as countries
such as Ecuador, taking the lead to establish islands of integrity.
Requiring declarations of conformity with a no bribes policy places
all parties on notice of the requirement. Nations must move
beyond voluntary measures towards legislation that amends or
creates new laws prohibiting bribery. If they do not, it will send a
clear signal that they intend to approve of the graft business as
usual.
Adoption of company codes with internal monitoring and
compliance checks will also help to change company culture.

196. Id.
197. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 27-111 and accompanying text (discussing FCPA cases).
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Employees have to know a company is seriously committed to the
eradication of bribery. Otherwise, employees might assume that
the boss does not want the details, and just wants the mission
accomplished, whatever the means to the end.
In this climate of increased awareness of the costs of bribery,
its impact on the structure of government and the values of
democracy and freedom offers hope to those who have sought to
change the international environment of business. In the meantime, companies like Vitusa will be in a legal dilemma. Failure to
receive payment may place a small company perilously close to, or
into, bankruptcy. Paying a fee may seem like the easy way to
secure payment. Decisions are never simple with costs like that
weighing in the balance.
If OECD, TI and individual countries like Germany make no
headway in terms of reform in this area within the next two years,
then it is unlikely that these efforts will ever achieve any results.
Careful monitoring of developments will reveal whether change is
only a chimera. But for the first time in eighteen years, there is a
glimmer of momentum - a shard of hope for reform.
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APPENDIX A
Recommendation of the Council of the OECD
on Bribery in International Transactions
The Council,
Having regard to Article 5 b) of the Convention on the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of 14th
December 1960;
Having regard to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises which exhort enterprises to refrain from bribery of
public servants and holders of public office in their operations;
Considering that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in
international business transactions, including trade and investment,
raising serious moral and political concerns and distorting international competitive conditions;
Considering further that all countries share a responsibility to
combat bribery in international business transactions, however their
nationals might be involved;
Recognizing that all OECD Member countries have legislation
that makes the bribing of their public officials and the taking of
bribes by these officials a criminal offence while only a few
Member countries have specific laws making the bribing of foreign
officials a punishable offence;
Convinced that further action is needed on both the national
and international level to dissuade both enterprises and public
officials from resorting to bribery when negotiating international
business transactions and that an OECD initiative in this area could
act as a catalyst for global action;
Considering that such action should take fully into account the
differences that exist in the jurisdictional and other legal principles
and practices in this area;
Considering that a review mechanism would assist Member
countries in implementing this Recommendation and in evaluating
the steps taken and the results achieved;
On the proposal of the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises;
General
I. Recommends that member countries take effective measures
to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials
in connection with international business transactions.
II. Considers that, for the purposes of this Recommendation,
bribery can involve the direct or indirect offer or provision of any
undue pecuniary or other advantage to or for a foreign public
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official, in violation of the official's legal duties, in order to obtain
or retain business.
Domestic Action
III. Recommends that each Member country examine the following
areas and, in conformity with its jurisdictional and other basic legal
principles, take concrete and meaningful steps to meet this goal.
These steps may include:
(i)
criminal laws, or their application, in respect of
bribery of foreign public officials;
(ii)
civil, commercial, administrative laws and regulations
so that bribery would be illegal;
(iii)
tax legislation, regulations and practices, insofar as
they may indirectly favor bribery;
(iv)
company and business accounting requirements and
practices in order to secure adequate recording of
relevant payments;
(v)
banking, financial and other relevant provisions so
that adequate records would be kept and made
available for inspection or investigation; and
(vi)
laws and regulations relating to public subsidies,
licenses, government procurement contracts, or other
public advantages so that advantages could be denied
as a sanction for bribery in appropriate cases.
International Co-operation
IV. Recommends that Member countries in order to combat
bribery in international business transactions, in conformity with
their jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, take the
following actions:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

consult and otherwise co-operate with appropriate

authorities in other countries in investigations and
other legal proceedings concerning specific cases of
such bribery through such means as sharing of information (spontaneous or "upon request"), provision of
evidence, and extradition;
make full use of existing agreements and arrangements for mutual international legal assistance and
where necessary, enter into new agreements or
arrangements for this purpose;
ensure that their national laws afford an adequate
basis for this co-operation.
Relations with Non-Members and
International Organizations
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V. Appeals to non-Member countries to join with OECD
Members in combating bribery in international business transactions and to take full account of the terms of this Recommendation.
VI. Requests the Secretariat to consult with international organizations and international financial institutions on effective means to
combat bribery as an aid to promote the policy of good governance.
VII. Invites Member countries to promote anti-corruption policies
within and beyond the OECD area and, in their dealings with nonMember countries, to encourage them to join in the effort to
combat such bribery in accordance with this Recommendation.
Follow-up Procedures
on International Investment and
the
Committee
Instructs
VIII.
Multinational Enterprises to monitor the implementation and
follow-up of this Recommendation. For this purpose, the Committee is invited to establish a Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions and in particular:
to carry out regular reviews of steps taken by Member
(i)
countries to implement this Recommendation, and to
make proposals as appropriate to assist Member
countries in its implementation;
to examine specific issues relating to bribery in
(ii)
international business transactions;
to provide a forum for consultations;
(iii)
to explore the possibility of associating with non(iv)
Members with this work; and
in close co-operation with the Committee on Fiscal
(v)
Affairs, to examine the fiscal treatment of bribery,
including the issue of tax deductibility of bribes.
IX. Instructs the Committee to report to the Council after the first
regular review and as appropriate thereafter, and to review this
Recommendation within three years after its adoption.
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APPENDIX B
LEVI STRAUSS & CO.
GUIDELINES FOR COUNTRY SELECTION
The following country selection criteria address issues which we
believe are beyond the ability of the individual business partner to
control.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

BRAND IMAGE
We will not initiate or renew contractual relationships in
countries where sourcing would have an adverse effect on our
global brand image.
HEALTH & SAFETY
We will not initiate or renew contractual relationships in
locations where there is evidence that Company employees or
representatives would be exposed to unreasonable risk.
HUMAN RIGHTS
We should not initiate or renew contractual relationships in
countries where there are pervasive violations of basic human
rights.
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
We will not initiate or renew contractual relationships in
countries where the legal environment creates unreasonable
risk to our trademarks to other important commercial interest
or seriously impedes our ability to implement these guidelines.
POLITICAL OR SOCIAL STABILITY
We will not initiate or renew contractual relationships in
countries where political or social turmoil unreasonably
threatens our commercial interests.
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BUSINESS PARTNER TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT
Terms of Engagement address issues that are substantially
controllable by our individual business partners.
We have defines business partners as contractors and subcontractors who manufacture or finish our products and suppliers who
provide material (including fabric, sundries, chemicals and/or
stones) utilized in the manufacture and finishing of our products.*
1. ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
We will only do business with partners who share our
commitment to the environment and who conduct their
business in a way that is consistent with Levi Strauss & Co.'s
Environmental Philosophy and Guiding Principles.
2. ETHICAL STANDARDS
We will seek to identify and utilize business partners who
aspire as individuals and in the conduct of all their businesses
to a set of ethical standards not incompatible with our own.
3. HEALTH & SAFETY
We will only utilize business partners who provide workers
with a safe and healthy work environment. Business partners
who provide residential facilities for their workers must
provide safe and healthy facilities.
4. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
We expect our business partners to be law abiding as
individuals (sic) and to comply with legal requirements
relevant to the conduct of all their businesses.
5. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
We only do business with partners whose workers are in all
cases present voluntarily, not put at risk of physical harm,
fairly compensated, allowed the right of free association and
not exploited in any way. In addition, the following specific
guidelines will be followed.
* WAGES AND BENEFITS
We will only do business with partners who provide wages
and benefits that comply with any applicable law and match
the prevailing local manufacturing or finishing industry
practices.
e WORKING HOURS
While permitting flexibility in scheduling, we will identify
prevailing local work hours and seek business partners who
do not exceed them except for appropriately compensated
overtime. While we favor partners who utilize less than
sixty-hour work weeks, we will not use contractors who, on
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a regular basis, require in excess of a sixty-hour week.
Employees should be allowed at least one day off in seven.
" CHILD LABOR
Use of child labor is not permissible. Workers can be no
less than 14 years of age and not younger than the compulsory age to be in school. We will not utilize partners who
use child labor in any of their facilities. We support the
development of legitimate workplace apprenticeship programs for the educational benefit of younger people.
" PRISON LABOR/FORCED LABOR
We will not utilize prison of forced labor in contracting
relationships in the manufacture and finishing of our
products. We will not utilize or purchase materials from
business partners utilizing prison or forced labor.
* DISCRIMINATION
While we recognize and respect cultural differences, we
believe that workers should be employed on the basis of
personal characteristics or beliefs. We will favor business
partners who share this value.
" DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES
We will not utilize business partners who use corporal
punishment or other forms of mental or physical coercion.
COMMUNITY BETTERMENT
We will favor business partners who share our commitment
to contribute to the betterment of community conditions.
*We will begin to apply the Terms of Engagement by
enforcing them with business partners involved in the
manufacture or finishing of our products and are extending
them to all suppliers to our Levi Strauss North America
business.^ A

